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Abstract
This paper uses a randomized experiment to study whether social networks affect vote choice.
In a fiercely contested presidential election in Peru with ten candidates, only 35% of subjects
were aware how their friends intended to vote. We compare people who were randomly informed
how one of their friends intended to vote to people who were randomly informed how an un-
named stranger intended to vote. We find no evidence that informing people people how their
friends intended to vote affects their vote choice.
JEL Classifications: D03, D72, D83, D85, O20, and O54
Keywords: Social networks, Voting, Social learning
∗PRELIMINARY: COMMENTS WELCOME. PLEASE DO NOT CITE WITHOUT PERMIS-
SION. Hoffman and Leon are doctoral candidates in economics and agricultural and resource economics, respectively,
at UC Berkeley. Contact: hoffman@econ.berkeley.edu, gianmarco@berkeley.edu. Josh Blumenstock, Willa Friedman,
Sean Gailmard, Jeremy Magruder, Jamie McCasland, Edward Miguel, John Morgan, Gautam Rao, Adam Szeidl,
and especially Donald Green provided helpful comments. We are grateful to our amazing team of enumerators in
Peru, and especially to Roberto Rodrguez who provided invaluable support coordinating all the data collection. Fi-
nancial support from the NET Institute (www.NETinst.org), the Center for Evaluation and Global Action (CEGA),
the Robert D. Burch Center for Tax Policy and Public Finance, and the Center for Equitable Growth is gratefully
acknowledged.
1
1 Introduction
Social scientists have long argued that voting decisions are not made in isolation.1 It is argued that
people do not simply privately take in information and then decide for whom to vote. Rather, we
make our decisions after interacting with other people, discussing our ideas and beliefs. Understand-
ing how other people affect our voting decisions has deep implications for political economy, for
example, for models of turnout and electoral competition, and to assess the informational efficiency
properties of elections.
While the idea that social networks affect vote choice is intuitive, credible causal evidence on
the question is quite scant. The basic challenge for identification is that social networks are unlikely
to be random. If we observe that people within a social network vote similarly, we do not know
whether this is due to social influence, homophily (the tendency of similarly-minded people to be
friends), or to a common environmental influence (e.g. happening to live in an area with a strong
Republican tradition). We break the identification problem using a randomized experiment where
we randomly inform some people how their friends intend to vote. In order for social influence
to occur, one seemingly necessary condition is for people to be aware how their friends intend to
vote. However, because the real-world is complex and time is scarce, information sharing within
social networks may be incomplete. If this is so, then randomly sharing information within a social
network will serve as means of increasing the amount of social influence.
We performed our experiment using the first round of the 2011 Peruvian Presidential Election.
The election was hotly contested with ten candidates, five of whom gathered over ten percent of
the vote. The election was highly volatile. As seen in Figure 1, there was substantial fluctuation
in the pre-election polls. On March 13th, now-president Ollanta Humala was in fourth place in the
polls at around 17%, but only four weeks later he had risen to a commanding lead. In contrast,
former President Alejandro Toledo was the frontrunner on March 13th only to see his share in the
polls fall by roughly 40 percent. In contrast to American presidential elections, where preference
for Democrats or Republicans is fixed for much of the electorate, voters opinions here seemed fluid
1That people’s opinions and voting decisions are affected by their friends has a long intellectual history in political
science and sociology, e.g. Lazarsfeld (1948).
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and potentially subject to social influence.
As a basic first step, we asked: How informed are people about the voting decisions of other
people within their social networks? In order for other people’s behavior to affect our own, a
seemingly necessary condition is for us to be aware of their behavior. In economic theory, social
networks are often defined as collections of persons where interactions occur and information is
freely shared. However, we know from introspection that even among our closest friends, not all
information is shared. People have busy lives and constantly exchanging all the information at our
disposal is not feasible, even if such information is informative. It remains an empirical question
whether people can correctly forecast their friends’ likely voting behavior. In our setting, we find
that only 35% of people were aware how their friends intended to vote.
This set the stage for our experiment. We interviewed a random sample of voters in four
districts of Lima (Peru’s capital city), asked them for whom they intended to vote, and for a list
of their four closest friends. We then contacted the subjects’ friends (after receiving the subjects’
permission), and we randomly pass on the subjects’ voting intentions to half of them. Throughout,
we paid special attention to people’s beliefs, analyzing people’s beliefs about the voting behavior of
other people within and outside their social network. When people are informed how their friends
intend to vote, does this make them more likely to vote the same way? That is, are voting decisions
socially influenced? If so, what is the mechanism for this effect? For example, are people engaging
in social learning, where they infer information about a politician’s quality or position based on
their friend’s voting intention? Or, instead, is the effect due to conformity, where people derive
utility from making the same decision as others in their social network?
Our main finding is that being informed how a friend intends to vote appears to have no effect
on vote choice. This result is consistent across different specifications. However, due to small
sample size, we cannot rule out economically meaningful magnitudes of social influence.
To our knowledge, ours is the first randomized experiment on social networks and vote choice.
Problems of endogeneity arise in most non-experimental work on this topic.2 In terms of exper-
iments, the existing ones we are aware of are experiments in the US which provide a treatment
2However, see the very interesting work by the political scientist Betsy Sinclair.
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to one person and then see if other people are affected. McConnell et al. (2010) vary the number
of people they treat in a zip code with a social pressure experiment and see if other non-treated
people are more likely to vote, finding no effect on untreated people. One concern with interpreting
these results in the context of social networks is that people’s friends in the US context are not
particularly more likely to live within the same zip code compared to another zip code within the
same town (see e.g. the work of James Fowler).3 Our experiment goes further by eliciting individ-
ually who a person’s friends are. In addition, we are the first to ask people to try to predict their
friends’ vote choice. Voters’ beliefs here (and their potential overconfidence) may be of interest in
their own right.4
While our findings are of general relevance to political economy, understanding whether and
how social networks affect voting may be of particular importance for developing countries. First,
many people in the developing world lack access to a wide range of media sources (e.g. a variety
of newspapers or television channels) affecting the way information about the political process is
disseminated. A person’s neighbors or social network may play a substitute role for the media.
Second, many political institutions in the developing world have an inherently social character.
Consider, for example, a patronage network. In a patronage network, a landlord, big-man, or
other local influential leader instructs other people how to vote. The initial people receiving the
information from the leader often relay this information to others. What role does social influence
play in allowing patronage networks to operate? Finally, understanding the connection between
social networks and voting may be useful for empowering the poor. In most developing countries, the
poor outnumber the rich, yet governments fail to implement redistributive policies and to provide
the poor with critical services. Efforts to politically empower the poor must crucially understand
the way by which the poor form opinions and ultimately decide for whom to vote. Although we
3Experiments on social pressure have shown to be effective in the US (Gerber et al., 2008), but social pressure is
very different from analyzing the effect of social networks.
4We also make a small contribution to the growing literature in psychology and economics on overconfidence.
See Moore and Healy (2008) for an excellent discussion of the recent overconfidence literature. We believe that
overconfidence may be related to the fact that people are uninformed on how their friends are voting to start
with. In situations where information acquisition is endogenous, overconfidence may lead individuals to under-
acquire information (Hoffman, 2010). If I mistakenly believe that I already know how everyone votes, then I won’t
take the time to speak with people and learn about their actual political views. Understanding whether people are
overconfident in this manner is important for understanding what networks do and do not do in transmitting political
information.
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our cautious in drawing strong conclusions from our results, they appear to support the idea that
voting decisions in developing countries are more private than one might expect.
Our paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the experimental design. Section 3 presents
our results. Section 4 concludes.
2 The Experiment
The basic design for our experiment is passing on information from one friend to another about
whom they intend to vote for, as well as the reason for their vote (e.g. “Mr. X is voting for candidate
Y because he’s tough on corruption”). Since people often provide reasons for their preferences in
everyday conversation, we decided that our experimental treatment would be most natural and
effective if we included subjects’ reasons for their vote preferences. We refer to the first people
interviewed as “subjects,” and the people to whom information may be passed to as “friends.”
2.1 Data Collection for Subjects
Before the election, we interviewed 168 subjects in four districts in the region of Lima. The region
of Lima contains the capital city of the same name, and the region contains one third of the national
population. The election was held on Sunday and subjects were interviewed several days before on
Monday, Tuesday, or Wednesday. Two of the districts are middle-income and two are lower-income
districts. Subjects were interviewed at home. We collected information on (i) basic demographics,
(ii) political preferences, (iii) intention to vote, (iv) intended vote choice, and (v) a person’s main
reason for supporting their intended vote choice. Additionally, we asked each subject to list four
friends and to provide their friends’ contact information.5 Subjects were asked questions about
the nature of their friendship (e.g. how often they interact, if they lend money to one another,
whether they were friends on Facebook), as well as to predict their friend’s vote. Subjects were
asked “Just to satisfy our curiosity, for whom do you think each of your friends will vote?” We
also asked subjects to state their confidence level from 0 to 100 percent about the chance their
5We chose this based on a pilot where almost all subjects could successfully name four friends.
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prediction of their friends’ vote would be correct. We used the survey tools developed by Charles
Manski for eliciting subject probabilities (as used in political economy research, for example, by
Delavande and Manski (2010)). As in Delavande and Manski (2010), beliefs were elicited without
financial incentives. At the end of initial survey, we asked subjects for their approval to share the
information provided with their friends.6
2.2 Randomization and Data Collection for Friends
We interviewed 668 friends on the Wednesday, Thursday, Friday, and Saturday before the Sunday
election. For each subject, two of the four friends received information about how the subject
intended to vote and the reason for their vote. The other half of friends were informed how
someone else the enumerators spoke with recently intended to vote. They friends were simply told
that the enumerators had been interviewing many people and that one of the people we spoke to
(who the enumerator does not name) intended to vote a certain way.7 The translated scripts for
the experiment were as follows:
TREATMENT: As you know, people have different ideas about for whom to vote, as well as different reasons for
their vote choice. I recently talked to your friend, Mr / Ms. (NAME OF SUBJECT), and he / she told us at the
next election he / she intends to vote for (PREFERRED CANDIDATE FOR THE SUBJECT) because (REASON
CITED BY SUBJECT). CONTROL: As you know, people have different ideas about for whom to vote, as well
as different reasons for their vote choice. For example, during this work we are interviewing people around Lima,
and one of the people we spoke with told me that in the next election he / she intends to vote for (CANDIDATE
PREFERRED BY LAST RESPONDENT) because (REASON CITED BY LAST RESPONDENT).
About 50 of the friends had subjects who reported that they were not sure how they intended
to vote. Since these subjects did not have any vote choice for which to treat the friends, they are
dropped from the analysis. The friends were asked background questions about the subjects. They
are also asked questions about the nature of their relationship with the subjects.
6A concern is that this may induce selection bias in our experiment. However, only two subjects refused to do so,
and they are excluded from the analysis.
7We do this to mitigate the possibility of getting a positive effect of the treatment solely to a politician’s name
being salient. See also Cai et al. (2009) for a similar strategy in a different context to separate salience from social
learning.
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2.3 Follow-up
The follow-up survey began on the Wednesday after the election and lasted for nine days. The
official results of the election were released before the follow-up survey began.8 We interviewed all
subjects and friends, with the main goal of assessing how people voted. Our main way of doing
this was by asking the subjects to reproduce their vote on a blank ballot in private. Subjects fill
out the ballot in private and return it sealed to the enumerator.9 In addition, we asked subjects
for a candidate ranking and for a likeability index. We find very high correlation among all three
measures. While not being able to observe subjects’ official vote is a concern, this very high
correlation is suggestive of nearly all subjects truthfully reporting to us how they voted. Though
subjects have no incentive for truthful reporting, it is difficult to construct reasons for misreporting.
We also asked several additional questions including a survey battery about conformity (taken from
the psychology literature).
3 Experimental Results
We first provide summary statistics about subjects and friends. One interesting fact is that align-
ment between subjects and friends voting is not particularly high. Only about 28% of people are
voting the same way as their friends. This is not terribly surprising given the large number of
candidates.
3.1 Predicting Friends’ Votes
We first examine whether people can predict the voting patterns of their friends. For this question,
no regression is required–we simply look at what share of people can answer this question correctly.
Subjects were only correct about 35% percent of the time in predicting their friends’ voting choices.
In an election with 10 candidates, most people do not know how their friends intend to vote.
Further results are shown in Table 3. Subjects who report being closer to their friends are better
8The official results showed results for 85% of the electorate, but the differences were large enough to predict who
was going to go to the run-off.
9This is the methodology used by Peruvian polling firms, as well as the methodology used in Leon (2011).
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able to predict how their friends are voting, whereas the effect of closeness of friend to subject
is insignificant. Whether subjects report talking about politics is also highly predictive, whereas
other forms of interaction such as whether one lends money to their friend or leaves their kids with
their friend are not predictive. Subjects confidence in their guess is also highly predictive beyond
other variable. The analysis is continued using subject fixed effects. That is, within subject,
what determines whether they can predict the vote of some friends better than others? Subject
confidence in their guess remains predictive after network fixed effects are added.
3.2 Effect of Information on Vote Choice
To investigate whether the introduction of information about who is your friend voting for affects the
way in which you vote, we exploit our randomization. First, we will isolate the effect of information
flows within the network, by including network specific fixed effects. Further, within the network,
we compare the vote of two members of the same network, one who receives the information about
the Subject’s vote and one who doesn’t. Equation (1) will test this hypothesis:
yik = α+ β2Jik + γZk + ηFik + δi + ik (1)
where, yik is a dummy that represents the alignment between friend k and subject i’s vote. Here,
we include term Jik, which indicates whether subject k in network i received information about
subject i’s vote. Zk is a set of individual characteristics of friend k, while Fik is a vector containing
information specific to the relationship between the friend and the subject. Importantly, we are
able to control for all the network specific unobservables, by including δi in the equation. The fact
that we are able to isolate the network specific factors in this regressions allow us to identify the
sole effect of information sharing within the network, which will be independent of the effect of the
endogenous nature of networks. The coefficient that captures the effect of interest is β2.
Further, we will explore the causal mechanisms though which this effect is going through, and
for which particular groups of the population is this effect more relevant. For this, we will exploit
the broad set of information collected in the baseline and follow-up interviews.
Results from running equation (2) are shown in Table 4. In this case, our dependent variable
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is whether the subject’s voting intention is the same as the friend’s actual vote. The information
treatment actually lowers the probability of alignment by 2 percentage points, but the effect is
highly insignificant. When controls are added, the effects tends almost exactly toward zero, though
the magnitude is essentially the same.
We explore further the treatment effect in Table 5 by examining a number of interaction effects.
The zero treatment effect appears to be fairly constant across types of friendships, though large
standard errors limit the confidence of our inference. The treatment is larger when the friend
reports being closer to the subject. The treatment is also larger when the friend says that the
subject and themselves are closer to one another politically. However, these interactions are all
statistically insignificant. Further, our index of conformity is not predictive of voting alignment,
nor is the interaction statistically significant.
4 Conclusion
Identifying the effect of social networks on voting is difficult. Rather than randomizing networks,
this paper takes a different tack of randomizing information about voting by other network mem-
bers. By using a randomized experiment, we avoid the usual confounds of homophily and common
environmental shocks. We find that informing people how their friend intended to vote appears to
have no effect on vote choice. That is, people do not appear to respond differently to advice about
how one of their friends intends to vote compared to information from an unnamed stranger.
In ongoing work, we seek to further understand our treatment effects. In addition, we are
working on interpreting our results through a model of social learning. We may also estimate a
structural discrete choice model of vote choice.
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Figure 1: Pre-Election Polls, Peruvian Presidential Election
Notes: This figure plots the poll results for the leading candidates in the first round of the 2011 Peruvian
Presidential Election. On the x-axis is the date and on the y-xais is the candidate’s vote share in the poll.
The polls are conducted in person by the polling firm Ipsos-Apoyo.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics - Subject
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Age 168 38.70 13.67 18 70
Gender 168 0.46 0.50 0 1
Years of Education 162 11.43 3.16 0 21
No interest in politics 166 0.12 0.33 0 1
Little interest in politics 166 0.40 0.49 0 1
Somewhat interested in politics 166 0.36 0.48 0 1
Very interested in politics 166 0.13 0.33 0 1
Extreme Left 162 0.04 0.20 0 1
Left 162 0.10 0.31 0 1
Center 162 0.49 0.50 0 1
Right 162 0.25 0.44 0 1
Extreme Right 162 0.10 0.31 0 1
Political information from: Family 168 0.58 0.50 0 1
Political information from: Friends 168 0.55 0.50 0 1
Political information from: Radio 168 0.54 0.50 0 1
Political information from: Newspaper 168 0.73 0.44 0 1
Political information from: TV 168 0.96 0.19 0 1
Political information from: Internet 168 0.20 0.40 0 1
Closeness to the friend 668 0.60 0.32 0.1 1
Trust friend with money 664 0.78 0.42 0 1
Trust subject with kids 664 0.58 0.49 0 1
Trust subject to return money 661 0.78 0.42 0 1
Confidence in the prediction 668 34.59 39.86 0 100
How often do you discuss politics with your friend? 668 2.22 1.67 0 5
Correct prediction 668 0.35 0.48 0 1
Notes: This table presents summary statistics about the subjects in the data. Each subject was asked about four of his or her
friends. Alignment refers to the subject and the friend voting the same way.
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Table 2: Summary Statistics - Friend
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Age 664 37.366 13.808 18 70
Gender 668 0.482 0.500 0 1
Years of Education 668 11.314 3.178 0 21
Political information from: Family 660 0.526 0.500 0 1
Political information from: Friends 660 0.550 0.498 0 1
Political information from: Radio 660 0.502 0.500 0 1
Political information from: Newspaper 660 0.717 0.451 0 1
Political information from: TV 660 0.942 0.233 0 1
Political information from: Internet 660 0.189 0.392 0 1
No interest in politics 654 0.162 0.369 0 1
Little interest in politics 654 0.384 0.487 0 1
Somewhat interested in politics 654 0.317 0.465 0 1
Very interested in politics 654 0.138 0.345 0 1
Extreme Left 667 0.037 0.190 0 1
Left 667 0.135 0.342 0 1
Center 667 0.550 0.498 0 1
Right 667 0.210 0.408 0 1
Extreme Right 667 0.067 0.251 0 1
Trust friend with money 660 0.736 0.441 0 1
Trust subject with kids 660 0.579 0.494 0 1
Trust subject to return money 659 0.795 0.404 0 1
Subject and opinion leader? 643 0.619 0.239 0.1 1
Closeness to the subject 660 0.622 0.315 0.1 1
Closeness to the subject in political ideas 640 0.453 0.277 0.1 1
Alignment in vote intention (Baseline) 590 0.278 0.448 0 1
Alignment in vote (Follow-up) 664 0.283 0.451 0 1
Notes: This table presents summary statistics about the friends in the data. Each subject was asked about four of his or her
friends. Alignment refers to the subject and the friend voting the same way.
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Table 3: Determinants of Correctly Predicting How Your Friend Will Vote
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Closeness of S to F 0.196 0.155 0.102 0.136 -0.005
(0.086)** (0.082)* (0.071) (0.124) (0.104)
Closeness of F to S 0.098 0.066 0.013 0.116 0.088
(0.084) (0.085) (0.075) (0.123) (0.113)
Subject’s confidence in prediction 0.006 0.006
(0.001)*** (0.001)***
S talks with F about politics 0.070 0.021 0.031 0.003
(0.014)*** (0.012)* (0.030) (0.028)
S trusts F with money 0.059 -0.014 -0.014 -0.066
(0.056) (0.052) (0.094) (0.088)
S trusts F with taking care of kids -0.038 -0.047 0.024 -0.023
(0.048) (0.047) (0.075) (0.073)
Age subject 0.002 0.000 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Age friend 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Male subject 0.014 -0.010 -0.047
(0.053) (0.049) (0.041)
Male friend 0.002 -0.010 -0.008 -0.067 -0.062
(0.045) (0.045) (0.040) (0.057) (0.053)
Yrs education, S -0.002 -0.004 -0.002
(0.009) (0.008) (0.006)
Yrs education, F -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.003 -0.005
(0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.009) (0.009)
Constant 0.355 0.152 0.091 0.093 0.164 0.261
(0.024)*** (0.163) (0.159) (0.131) (0.159) (0.157)*
Subject FE No No No No Yes Yes
Obs 668 631 627 627 627 627
R-squared 0.00 0.03 0.10 0.28 0.42 0.49
Notes: The dependent variable is whether or not a subject’s prediction of their friend’s vote choice is correct. Standard errors
are clustered at the network (subject) level. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table 4: Effects of Information Sharing on Voting
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep Var Alignment (Intent Vote Subject = Vote Friend)
Treatment -0.024 -0.020 -0.019 0.004
(0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.033)
Age - Friend 0.002 0.003
(0.002) (0.002)*
Gender - Friend -0.032 -0.056
(0.046) (0.041)
Yrs. Of education - Friend 0.008 0.012
(0.008) (0.006)*
Alignment (Baseline) 0.587
(0.051)***
Constant 0.274 0.272 0.128 -0.078
(0.028)*** (0.017)*** (0.127) (0.094)
Network FE No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 664 664 660 585
R-squared 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.34
Notes: The dependent variable is whether or not the subject votes the same way as their friend. Standard errors clustered at
the network (subject) level. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table 5: Treatment Effect Interactions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep Var Alignment (Intent Vote Subject = Vote Friend)
Treatment -0.019 -0.008 0.033 0.058 0.023 0.030
(0.035) (0.105) (0.129) (0.079) (0.069) (0.197)
Age - Friend 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001)* (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)*
Gender - Friend -0.032 -0.056 -0.056 -0.043 -0.041 -0.056
(0.046) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041)
Yrs. Of education - Friend 0.008 0.012 0.013 0.013 0.015 0.012
(0.008) (0.006)* (0.008)* (0.006)** (0.006)** (0.006)*
Alignment (Baseline) 0.587 0.587 0.597 0.592 0.587
(0.051)*** (0.051)*** (0.051)*** (0.051)*** (0.051)***
Age*Treatment 0.000
(0.003)
Education*Treatment -0.003
(0.010)
Closeness -0.082
(0.113)
Closeness*Treat 0.047
(0.080)
Political Closeness -0.057
(0.126)
Political Closeness*Treat 0.035
(0.096)
Conformity Index -0.048
(0.349)
Conformity Index*Treat -0.008
(0.268)
Constant 0.128 -0.072 -0.095 -0.125 -0.126 -0.074
(0.127) (0.104) (0.109) (0.106) (0.106) (0.172)
Network FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 660 585 585 577 562 585
R-squared 0.01 0.34 0.34 0.36 0.36 0.34
Notes: The dependent variable is whether or not the subject votes the same way as their friend. Standard errors clustered at
the network (subject) level. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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